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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (4) Autor Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe (3) Schilizzi, Steven (3) Banerjee, Simanti (1) Kwasnica, Anthony M. (1) Shortle, James S. (1) Palavra-chave Auctions (4) Economic experiments (4) Conservation (3) Environmental Economics and Policy (3) Procurement (3) Tenders (3) C91 (2) C92 (2) D44 (2) Land Economics/Use (2) Model validation (2) Q24 (2) Q28 (2) Agricultural policy (1) Ecosystem Services (1) Environmental policy (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Learning (1) Market-based instruments (1) Plus: assessment method (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Working or Discussion Paper (2) Ano 2011 (3) 2009 (1) País United States (4) Idioma Inglês (4)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última A note on the performance measure of conservation auctions AgEcon Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe; Schilizzi, Steven. We argue that previous assessments of discriminatory-price conservation auctions may have systematically overestimated their performance relative to uniform-payment schemes due to an inappropriate counterfactual comparison. We demonstrate that the cost curve (and not the bid curve) is the relevant supply curve when a uniform payment is offered and provide a theoretically rigorous counterfactual based on that insight. We estimate that the performance of BushTender may have been overrated by more than 50%. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Plus: assessment method; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100885 An Iterative Auction for Spatially Contiguous Land Management: An Experimental Analysis AgEcon Banerjee, Simanti; Shortle, James S.; Kwasnica, Anthony M.. Tackling the problem of ecosystem services degradation is an important policy challenge. Different types of economic instruments have been employed by conservation agencies to meet this challenge. Notable among them are Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes that pay private landowners to change land uses to pro-environmental ones on their properties. This paper focuses on a PES scheme – an auction for the cost-efficient disbursal of government funds for selection of spatially contiguous land management projects. The auction is structured as an iterative descending price auction where every bid is evaluated on the basis of a scoring metric – a benefit cost ratio. The ecological effectiveness and economic efficiency of the auction is tested with data... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Ecosystem Services; Economic experiments; Auctions; Spatial contiguity; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Land Economics/Use; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103220 Evaluating conservation auctions with limited information: the policy maker’s predicament AgEcon Schilizzi, Steven; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe. Buying environmental services from private landholders using tendering mechanisms are usually subject to a budget constraint. Auction theory has mostly focused on target-constrained auctions and is less well developed for this type of auction. This paper examines a theoretical model specifically developed for budget-constrained tenders and assesses its capacity to predict tendering performance under information limitations typical of those found in field applications. But this assessment cannot be done without complementing the model with controlled laboratory experiments. Subject to their external validity, we find that the model is able to make the correct policy recommendation when comparing the tender to an equivalent fixed price scheme, even when the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Economic experiments; Model validation; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use; C91; C92; D44; Q24; Q28. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/100884 Predicting the performance of conservation tenders when information on bidders's costs is limited AgEcon Schilizzi, Steven; Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe. Buying environmental services from private landholders using tendering mechanisms are usually subject to a budget constraint. Auction theory has mostly focused on target-constrained auctions and is not well developed for this type of auction. This paper examines the predictive capacity of a simple model developed for budget-constrained tenders, already used to design new conservation programs, by submitting it to controlled lab experiments. We study the capacity of the model to predict both experimental bids and the performance of the auction institution, based on the kind of limited information typically available to a conservation agency. We conclude there exists an optimal level of information on bidders’ costs, neither too large nor to small, making... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Auctions; Procurement; Tenders; Conservation; Learning; Economic experiments. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/48171 Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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